A "Rough" Inquiry and into a Conceptual Framework: Gödelian-Bayesian Algebras and Rotational Relativity

"Omne ignotum fro magnifico est" – Vico, *The New Science*

Author: Alex Patterson

Inspiration, Boston, *More than a Feeling*
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SSR6ZzjDZ94

Abstract: in ideal circumstances, we know exactly what to do. But there are no ideal circumstances. That is why we have Critique. The object of critique matters not.

However, this paper is also very concerned not only with critique as such but with a possible intersection, that has arisen out of such critique, of a heretofore un-combined areas of mathematical induction, Gödelian Relativity, and their Algebras within Bayesian Networks. It is very rough attempt, but uses all the right tools, should such an Intersection be theoretically viable in the short term, at least.

Further steps are made into Ethics, which the author believes to be the basis of any elegance for that matter, of any excellent piece of intellectual effort.

This paper uses its own peculiar lettering system for each paragraph. I don't like it: But the way I write it is the only way I can figure to impose some kind of order for the content. Seemingly arcane references will be made to philosophers such as Vico and Kant, to Heine and Goethe, to Wittgenstein and B.F. Skinner, J.L. Austin, Turing, Thomas Paine, G.H. von Wright, Marx, the "Availability Heuristic," Quantum Logic, More Classical Systems of Axiomatic Problems, Epistemology, etc., et. al. Towards the end a Narrative will be given that attempts to address some concerns of the present world in its ethical, moral, and political makeup. There will be no cut-off at that point, but the change will be clearly visible, it is hoped that there will be a "fade to gray" effect. The Reader's forbearance and endurance to "strange thoughts"(but which are informed by the author's education) is solicited as the paper proceeds: Even a crank might not be a crank, as a liar may not be a liar. Such are our weak paradoxes.

Therefore, this:

1.   New terms and tools are introduced for quantification that creates a more synthetic (logical, reasonable, coherent) intervention and inter-weaving into these (those) now classical problems of the assumptions and the successes in the Gödel material and literature.

2.   Asymptotes are used within vertical and horizontal graphs to justify a future that need not be seen as a future in the sense of grammatical future-tense (it is considered by the best philosophical grammarians to be a tense that doesn't exist), but as a potential part in such systems themselves that we deal with respect to incompleteness.

3.   The thesis is that we can approach incompleteness by using theoretical reasoning and available tools that are allowed in theoretical reasoning to critique the very theory of incompleteness itself. That is the essential Abstract Thesis.

4.   It will be seen that a real attempt is attempted. It is quite a ride. I've looked at everything I can think of so far. In doing Gödel you can't tell a hypothesis from a position. So it is necessary to be very analytical, use Occam's razor wherever you can but still brave the undesired feat of blunting the blade. This is not Quine, and there is no Neurath's Figure to resort to as Quine does, and in his area, must do, much to his discredit, as great as he may be.

This critique (work, paper) works from Gödel's incompleteness to Gödel relativity. It does so in with the help of formal logic and inductive thinking, and a lot of hard analysis and questioning of various facts, the interrogation of assumptions, so that the critique can end up where it belongs: in the ethical domain of inquiry, not an easy category of thought to express, but which will be further versioned in subsequent editions.

A. There's something to typeface and script languages like Java that isn't at all like a C language quite obviously, which Michael J. Burns and I worked out in a few sentences that might be worth more than all of these pages, by question and answer. We won't got into it hear except to typeface Vico.

> In the long course that rumor has run from the beginning of the world it has been the perennial source of all the exaggerated opinions which have hitherto been held concerning remote antiquities unknown to us, by virtue of that property of the human mind noted by Tacitus in his Life of Agricola, where he says that everything unknown is taken for something great (omne ignotum fro magnifico est). – Gianbattista Vico, La Scienze nouva, The New Science

B. What better place to start with a man who hated rumor 'legerdemain' unless it was he who was doing it (which is also something Christopher Hitchens said of Chomsky's socialism), an approach that became a very fascinating and productive pathology later: he is Wittgenstein. I note that B.F. Skinner and Gödel and Vico held etymology in high regard in their work, as did Vico, who was an obsessive on it, for good reason, he had every reason to be so. That is no coincidence. Wittgenstein's language games do bear a family resemblance, forgive me.

BB. W is (in)famous for his "infamous" earlier statement (I believe it was earlier, but we aren't obsessive Joycean scholars, so it hardly matters), is much more unforgiving, choleric, and cruel than this snippet I non-determistically nicked from the world wide web to keep things arbitrary and analytically unbiased at the start, so I was Double-Blinded by my own self: We are the ones who as children never leave that state because that is the way it is with us, that is the way it became with us shy ones at some individual moment when the sturdiest of gaps in time that are merely time-arbitrated (maybe it's deontic. . .) for the moment, And the time between an action-thought-desire (grossly speaking, intention) and the action itself was a matter of a discernment, which cannot explained as standardly received, because discernment is nuanced, i.e. it is diacritical matter, the words etymological derivations of the same modality, the *deontic*: ethical judgement prior to acting; and that is the matter at hand here. They are the ones who as children never leave that state because that is the way it is with them, that is the way it became at some individual moment when the weakest gap in time between an act-desire and an action or an epistemological-expression-desire and a desire to reflect on it, a need to, breaks. That is the tragical for such a child. S/he gets back up. Piaget was right about children: they are mankind's only innovators, by the very virtue of who

they are. This is one of the curiosities of Gödel enthusiasts themselves, even if the obsession becomes a vice.

C. "Wittgenstein questions the intra-systemic and extra-mathematical *usability* . . . of *P* [in various discussions of Gödel in the *Nachlass* (Rodych 2002, 2003)] and, at (§19), he emphatically says that one...

"...cannot "make the truth of the assertion ['*P*' or "Therefore *P*"] plausible to me, since you can make no use of it except to do these bits of legerdemain."

D. An incomplete piece of information '⊢' or 'P' is encoded in the system where I t already is: where it is TRU but not PRVBLE. (I won't predicate a the turnstiles of that which they say something about that is only true without their predication.)

DD. One has to ask, 'which is it first?' Something is not PRFV nor PRFBL nor PRBL but is TRU in S? Or, something is TRU but not PRFV nor PRFBLE no PRBL (still in S?)? These statements are as autonomous as they are dependent on one another and for all the wrong reasons.

DDD. At any rate, the most elementary accepted encode symbol for a Gödel number is *s*, sometimes s#.

E. *s* is obliged to act as an analytic function-word in syntax that moves elements until there is a synthetic layer of meaning: a synthesis. The Gödel number is a syntactic unit clearly and not a mocking minstrel show sub-study Piaget master-class in mathematical logic or in the relevance of mathematics or the foundations of mathematics: It is not an oeuvre! It becomes an oeuvre once it leaves the presumption that it is one and even better language games become possible and lords over it benignly. Which doesn't seem likely.

F. s.f denotes meaninglessness: s.fx changes that like fire to a dry bail of cotton. It is meaningful to express the syntactical dynamics like this: s.f + ADD-x, or + MULT-x or

DIVD-x or ORDS-X, with all arithmetic laws as commutative, associative, etc., left untouched. Call it, *adducing-x.* (I'm not interested in data type inference, for example.)

FF. It is not furtive to state that it is a transition from one state of something to another, if not to an alternative target object altogether, or dropped into a different system entirely:

FFF. The drop-thru would crack up. If not it will be a representation of modus ponens that we can watch, and if not, it will happen somewhere where we cannot watch it, and we know not whereof nor what-of, and should not even speculate about that unique syntactical unit which is also a form, that unique form which is also a syntactical unit, perhaps even in this system. That is a problem. Modus ponens is has a nomic distribution pattern and volume that we ignore at great risk, pace von Wright. The example of two steel bars that are one 'bar' because they were forged (not connected together after one and then the other was forged, that didn't happen) where they have at their two buttressing ends to one another a conical narrowing on both 'sides' to the point where there is a some micro-millimeter length or squared or cubed of steel (is it a point, a length, a point as a non-Euclidean cube Length x Length x Length not Length x Length' x Length'' as the standard cube, is it a fucking competitor with the Planck-length, at least in some mathematical framework that conceptually works, or is it a new Maxwell's demon, just not thermodynamically? – an oxymoron, fine, but still) that is simply part of the whole rod: nearest-neighbor gets a radically new property, does it not? Well, it is as close as a physical object that we can make and / or see to what is modus ponens in nature, in logic, it's the same. There are no limits. As Balzac said, and he said it in English, for whatever reason, *All is true.* He meant it in every possible anti-thetical sense to a statement of a tautology. That's interesting for a man who wanted to catch every aspect of life in little known part of Paris over three generations with several hundred characters in one book, *Pierre Goriot.*

FFFF. The possibilities in which this may happen are many and perhaps contingent, or finitely ruled with one free or more free variables, but the exponentially more and at adding each new free variable in consideration of *x-unknown-reason*, which would create a massive system of complexity, unless we go an order of magnitude or more, a few scales to make sense of it by. There is nothing about counting or infinity to talk about here at all. That is an issue.

G. The Gödel-syntax is traced-out leaving unbound automata as a usable trail. The witness and disjunction property to stands as a unique instance of its use.

GG. Define unique? Define the tape, then. On this imaginary tape there is an imaginary symbol that Turing (if reading von Wright, we might be able to argue, only after investigation with the appropriate axioms and theorems for some said logical system, that it may be a Symbol of a symbol, as in von Wright's work on *The Symbolic Challenge*, enough) said should be read, but not imagined. In the drop-thru it was read, with an output Q and the appearance of the DWP (disjunction and witness property, that of which is so important to intuitionist sets which have the capacity to generate copy members, whereas classical sets do not. This will be seen to very important later with respect to Gödel's theory of relativity, though the property but not the method will be invoked). With respect to the DWP, write asymptotic graphs of expansion or contraction with the witness and disjunction of P and Q in their relation to one another on a straight line with no Dedekind cuts: N ~ M. Whether it is contraction or expansion is another issue. There are different assumptions built into each.

H. What remains is a unique instance of the "set-theoretic property of existence and disjunction".

HH. N ~ M and r (P, Q) drew a Euclidean theorem-line to a real proposition. P ~ s.fx. is a vertical or horizontal asymptotic graph of a function where some objects similar summands make statistical corrections for unwanted knolls or dips: Statistical Geometrics was developed by Alfred Lánde in work on the foundations of quantum mechanics, which if I recall, went by that title: The Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, so I am getting at such an object that would work in that way. Odd as it may seem, that would allow for what I picture as a real genuine article Bayesian Matrix. Lánde and Feyerabend had a very good working relationship. (Unfortunately, PKF wasn't treated very well at Berkeley.)

HHH. This leads to stacking questions, answers, recursion, feats of statistical induction, all in one the form the other, as the case may be.

HHHH. Gödel material is fragile and shy. There is not a clear line between positions, hypotheses and guesses. A position leaves no space for a speculative but deterministic future about an answer to a question: The question is asked, and then it is answered. There is no "not known yet." That is a "language-game," per Wittgenstein, that can be solved by simply replying to someone in a conversation, or in his brick-builders language game where one brick hander hands the brick to the brick layer on the ladder, which is one of the forms of life imaginable, form being the key worked.

5H. The exhaustibility argument of Torkel Franzén is not breached: scatology, eschatology, doppelgängers, epochal passages, stages, and rotations are all there.

I. So far we haven't even talked about a potential metric in this system of systems, where things fall-thru but not to us always, yet in those cases by induction, wherein we have generative Bayesian inferences, let's say, if not to us then in some other way or to / in some other form unknown to us. Scatology may be the best option for us.

J. At any point of asking, you can predict, even posit, that there is a computation algorithm to calculate whether any "associated" theories are detected.

JJ. That the prediction occurs when looking down on and examining Gödel's incompleteness theorem and sentence from the outside is fair, since it is asking the question as to whether based on what we know outside of a possible syntactical limit or domain, is there a computational algorithm of interpretability once modes ponens is established in its mutated form from r (P, Q) to N ~ M, **when it is** presumably outside of the reach of *sf*, and therefore out of the system / domain wherein the encode and its sentence were required due to the relative nature of its relation to what exists incompletely outside of it, or its domain. The inside-outside connection is an issue hasn't been addressed, I can think of a variety of reasons why, none of which need to be correct. It is a kind of lens, a lens with an aspect-ratios viz. Gödel relativity and even the asymptotic nature of *aspect*-seeing. In fact the slopes of tangents play an very important role here with respect to time, before and after one pauses to think about it. I found these, Wittgenstein never would have thought of graphing them on a axes, but the kids either did, or knew sub-consciously. Referring and requesting data from Piaget on children's creativity would be helpful. Can we talk gesture vectors, facial expressions, automatic recognition and linguistic kick-in of verbal behavior name-spaces indexed as

noun phrases upon recognition at milliseconds? Yes we do, it appears. It's instantaneous. X-Bar NP mental recognitions-kick-in occurs at that same millisecond, as we say "It's a bird." Etc. "Now it's a cat." Children find this fun.

See the *aspect-seeing* pictures: Bird-Cat, Duck-Rabbit.

Courtesy of http://www.blameitonthevoices.com/2014/06/mindblowing-animal-graphs.html

JJJ. Otherwise, all of this can be answered and an end put to the rigor of what is otherwise willy-nilly: will-ye, nil-ye. This is possible. We shall forsake it, betray it, at risk to ourselves.

K. Take s.f, we don't have sufficient information about it to take it to PRF, whether PRF by OBSRV or proof AXM-THRM. A lack of sufficient information even on a radical theoretical object of inquiry is still to say (nay, to assert) that the remainder of the information exists and can be encapsulated, *contained*, *made* **mechanical**, *without predication or with predication stripped away* so as to be subject to natural interchangeability in the creation of *Kinds* instead of *Classes*, for precisely those reasons, . .

> . . . and the correct take on Quine's *Natural Kinds* in his *Ontological Relativity* – a book of essays I grew weary of many years ago, at least B.F Skinner produces results if he's going to walk to the talk of positivism: for that reason I dismiss

Carnap and Reichenbach also, especially, in my area, Carnap's foray(s) into transformational / generative grammar (two separate things), or at least phrasal demarcations, ergo stemmings.

K.' Containment and modality are intimate with each other. They would, in Quine's world of Natural Kinds, be of the same kind. Modality as *entailment* is a sort of containment as matters progress, or accumulate data as they move (and presumably move *asymptotically* towards *Form*), or are in motion, so to speak. A Brownian kind of movement to heterogeneous distribution of syntax and form, of: *sf* in decode mode, or debug mode, whatever, as it takes on form *sf.x.*

KK. This, from the previous public edition of this work,

Observing this may very well be a part of the fall, but it will definitely be a part of the modus ponens, since we will recognize our beloved, and cry hurrah! Let's get to work. And look at the work we've done that has added to modus ponens! Let's work! P was the antecedent to all of this! It dropped through in the *future* as Q. We can say that if Qy, Py! The direction is correct! We've derived the in the fall-through the antecedent-consequent with its great mate, the witness and disjunction property . . . of the *contrary-to-fact-conditional*, which is with great ignorance misidentified with the *counterfactual*, which it is not. There's an hardly excusable ignorance and convenience-settings from theoretical physics to philosophers of mind. Or are they that stupid, that ill-read on those who first talked about it centuries ago, and the few specialists of today, who are mostly dead now.

still needs work, but is sufficient for the purposes here. It will be handled in later work I suppose where we can use complex numbers in basic hierarchical intuitionist sets (Nash) to work with special functions, and in general generate copies of the sets' members, i.e. a member A gets a copy A' by virtue of 'the rules' of intuitionist sets. This will be seen to be handled within partly Bayesian means, but not in any way wholly so. Or, not. But, pondering over it for a brief moment tells me, Yes. And in another edition.

l. At this point both [p and [therefore p would have been acceptable to Wittgenstein. W has put down his poker (you know, the one used for tipping the wood and its

charcoaled red-hot debris) when teased by Popper in Russell's chambers that moral rules existed: Wittgenstein could not take this, picked up the poker and threatened Popper with it, waving it at him, Popper either in terror or in humor, and stormed out a beaten Hamlet. Only this time he is satisfied, and says to Russell ironically, probably smirking with delight, "He doesn't like rules, does he?"

ll. The idea is, of course, that syntaxes permeate the social world of the *constitutive* (the enabling conditions of institutions, i.e. society, pace Austin, and pace Wittgenstein in *On Certainty.* But from the definitive point of view, we owe it to Austin.

lll. If English had been a proto-Indo-European language the common phrase that we use, "of course," would be all we would need to immediately start building a civilization. But it wasn't. Barring moral ineptitudes in epochal duplicates.

llll. Entailment qua s.fx is impossible without acting in a constitutive system, in which reciprocity it exits.

5L.Qua the naturalistic pseudo-sets, which turn out to be, without contradictions in arithmetic and quite to the contrary, natural adjuncts to it: i.e. intuitionist sets; and with them, unconventionally covariant with them: Bayesian inference, in its various forms, up to today's notions of neural networks and generative learning.

5Ll. We will go so far to select-in the slopes of tangents algebraically and in their geometric counterparts as <u>complex aspects</u> (more on this, if there is time and space) or features and objects of, intuitive Bayesian inferences; as well *as such* the natural theorem-centric requirements in geometry derived of arithmetic that they already are.

5Lll. Looking at Gödel's rotational universe is a Bayesian matter straight-through, straight-on; the sun-flower pattern of it professes this. Picture it.

5Llll. The causal futures and pasts of that rotational universe, as an extension of Mach's principle of standing inert and then turning and moving his arms with his face to sky looking at Mars is fruitful and interesting and is all-too-obviously an extension of Gödel's work on incompleteness.

5Lllll. Submitting imperative expressions to a Universal Turing Machine is the same as querying it for an answer, best understood as Yes or No, where(as) with Orders (*do* this) it is best understood as seeing whether it will obey or not obey, which can be different from disobeying, depending both on the level of intelligence in the Machine, but in any case by any means limited to those pseudo bi-fictitious answers, since a Yes or a No or Obeying or (not)obeying) / (dis)obeying, can come in many different forms, and can be interpreted as more cogent depending on the context. That can be dangerous if the machine is so powerful as to rotate the universe. Say a physics student is auditing a course on the philosophy of mind, and there is a very clever and famous philosopher demonstrating a Universal Turing Machine, just as though he thought he could do so by demonstrating the Chinese Box argument. The professor takes some object, say a rock that he has prepared (bad stealth, bad karma, there, ominous of what's to come) and takes it in his hand and places it on his desk or whatever, removes his hand, and says to the rock (he's looking at it, yes, you heard it here), "Don't move!" He wants to demonstrate the imperative mode (there are more moods of verbs than there are modalities, which slices and dices due to an array of reasons), and reduce Turing Machines out of existence or to some kind of conjectural confusion, you got me, which he may state as the New X Conjecture. The rock doesn't move. The professor says, "You see! It's a Universal Turing Machine." That goodness in all its varieties that that physics student is there to peer-him: the physics student raises his hand a little bit without the professor noticing and the physics student says, "You forgot relative motion!" His buddy, next to him, exclaims, "And that's just for starters!" Some of the philosophy students start to cry.

5L.5L. A Gödel rotational universe is a Bayesian network, or a Bayesian spread, on a plane, on a slice or splice of space, whatever the nature of the topology, I suspect, etc. (the sunflower example), that is intra-or-inter systemic with the antecedence of 'P' and its nomic consequence, PRF.P, i.e. sf. and sf.x, or 'Q': the consequent value-proposition in the contrary-to-fact-conditional (CFC) of asserting Qy on condition Py, but without P, pace *FT* (see, NNN). Only the consequent is present, and it is PRF.P, i.e. the drop-thru of *sf* to *sfx.* From SCAT to CAT, i.e. from syncategorematic to a well formed category, not just *anything* that is not syncategorematic.

5L.5L.l. The form of the new drop-thru category is a unique instance of DWP, which gives us an expression, which if strung by clearly linked strings from there to here, can

be a sentence: "Your sister has a snail-skin mole in the nil-side of her left pinkie toe." "Really?   I   wouldn't   know." "No matter, I just thought you might know, being her brother an all." "Anyway, it's news." "Don't mention it." That specific. Like Shakespeare-specific, Hamlet to Claudius with high invective: "A little more than kin, and less than kind." The guy who has the sister would be an Evelyn Waugh version of Hamlet, very liberal in outlook. (There is nothing unusual about these observations in the field known as philosophical grammar. In fact Hamlet's *kinds* is a function von Wright's Symbolic Challenge, as I will show, in this edition, or not.)

5L.5L.l.l. This is of Quine's *Natural Kinds*, those natural kinds existing irrespective of other influencing elements. That is important and interesting, because for thing it has to be that way; having to be that way, *Natural Kinds* are absolute values, or the *family of kinds* is an absolute value. If this is so, and I think Quine would (have) have agreed that it *is so* irrespective of other influencing elements, then this is one of the contributing interchangeable (Quine, *Ontological Relativity*) to the following *rub.*

5L.5L.l.l. Here's the rub: there is a 'y' in the house, or on the reef, that has no category-binder P. It does for Q, given our assertion. Since 'y' is the predicative property of P and Q as the antecedent-consequent nomic pupils, we have a new axiom to count this out, i.e. a new Gödel number. In Shakespeare's time, a rub that couldn't be solved became the rack for the perpetrator.

5L.5L.l.l.l. In that framework, it occurs that an axiom isn't needed, you say, or declare?, since we have just moved from arithmetic and epistemology to a different kind of *constitutive* membership. A) It is most strongly the case in the most judicial sense that Bayesian networks and their dot-generative learning schemata, etc., is a matter of the witness and disjunction property (modus ponens), and a matter of any rendition of a set-theoretical category of membership.
B) But members of society are not sets.

M. These last several paragraphs permit the inherent and established generative capabilities of intuitionist sets to create copies of their members, and to see whether this is able to network with any one or more of the Bayesian theories of inference / **learning**, heretofore not mentioned. **Inference, and learning.** Vico places it:

"It is another property of the human mind, that whenever men can form no idea of distant and unknown things, they judge them by what is familiar and at hand. This axiom points to the inexhaustible source of all the errors about the beginnings of humanity that have been adopted by entire nations and by all the scholars. For when the former take notice of them and the latter to investigate them, it was on the basis of their own enlightenment, cultivated and magnificent times that they judged the origins of humanity, which must nevertheless by the nature of things have been small, crude and quite obscure. " Vico, The New Science, Elements.

N. So let's go to it. Is beings serious or is be working by induction? Both. There is a correlation that demands investigation: In sum, what has preceded *is all* of that that which constitutes the most efficient collection of sufficient conditions for us to look closely at the Boolean algebra, in our case as applied to / as an possibly inhering of syntax (algebra's uses, it is such a universally applicable tool that if it were compound to a singularity it would behave exactly like a modal auxiliary helping verb, as in, can help, or even *please* help, in Austin's Behabitives), with incompleteness material and proof material staring us in the face like a Medusa head.

N.' Which is a TRU species of proof that can take taken us to PRF; and in so doing, and irrespectively of it, that the movement from arithmetic that carries P and Q to the *constitutive* gets us nowhere. We can only *plead.*

N.' We have *excuses,* pace Austin (*A Plea for Excuses*), which is witchy document on the grandest of ethical and juristic scales, and this is where the deontic mode/ality (or simply, the deontic) comes in, and judicial matters of theory and practice, which interested Austin to the point where he said that the truth of something can never be proven (established?, it makes no difference, it is entailment and semantic), except by jury.

N.'' Gödel leads us into Law, as I always suspected it would. You could say that he leads in this particular problem to many areas, but if so, they are all of the same *Kind*, irrespective of approach. That we will see. *None of this is haphazard*, unless it's in your mind. The reasoning, with what is at hand (Austin, Gödel, Wittgenstein, Quine, Shakespeare, Vico, Pierce, etc., etc.) is what we do. We don't work by deduction and

discursive clarity, as Stephan Hawking does, as the students at Columbia fought against in 1968, we work by establishing hard-links between things at hand that get is somewhere without discursive elimination by dogma and bias and "therefore I'll not consider x", if they are able to carry hard-links. It's not theory, it is *critique*, even if we temporarily theorize in order to continue critique, in order not to be coerced into discontinuing inquiry (which Vico held as the worst vice, but today's peers hold as a virtue that they are so obsessive-compulsive about that it becomes a casually vindictive pastime – yawn, just another day of fuzzy word scanning for peer-confirmation metrics, which there are, even quantified mathematically, which is an invariable vice) and don't think that's a cop-out or a Houdini: you wouldn't notice the latter anyway. So reflect, 'y' is predicative:

N.''. 'MM. Epistemological paradoxes remain ***impredicative*** (as Gödel said) and the range of mathematical expression is not curtailed by, e.g., Dedekind cuts, or Not-x = X, after much axioms and theorems about the particular paradox of what means what (part ordinary language, part arithmetic, part theorem-centric logic).

NN. And, one does prefer a lanyard *at hand* in lieu of un-deflated academic rumor passing as theory. We need a Boolean algebra that works with the Propositional Calculus (PC) (as John Archibald Wheeler pointed out), which is the expressive algebra for the non-expressive Boolean algebra, not far off from Frege, who got everything wrong in spite of the right data. The Boolean algebra is a wholly inter-f-ed-up matter.

NNn. Connectives: AND / OR are syncategorematic (SCAT).

NNn'. Propositions: in the algebra are a different breed because they are subject to substitutability not least by functors. They and the connectives stand in need of any tangible factor x meaning: the function word 'and' needs a noun, for example. Even the article 'the' needs either a noun or needs to be made indicative 'this' or 'those,' for example. So, with the algebraic ANDs, ORs, etc. For Gödel provability by syntax, which is by its definition Gödelian, i.e. true but not provable, not 'illocutionary,' without entailment.

NNn'. Therefore, alone P is a variable in the algebra, i.e. P is the algebraic Boolean analog of a function-word: It stands in need of some tangible property x for entailment, so we may have precisely that property which is the witness and disjunction property so fundamental to entailment and bestows meaning on a horizontal arithmetical straight line where P and Q are disjunct on that horizontal line that receives a vertical graph on a function y = 1 / x. A *putative* asymptote is all we can say, but that says a lot.

> A graph for the function y = 1 / x appears as a syncategorematic vertical asymptote where x = c of the graph y = 1 / x as x approaches *per definition* a discontinuous value c, at x = c, the asymptotic.

MM. The legislation of the logical foundations of mathematics is removed as mere clothing from mathematics. Russell's masochistic wet dream of using logic to create a logical foundations for mathematics is utterly Freud-ed away as Oedipal or "dream-work" of envy and love of Frege.

'MM. Epistemological paradoxes remain impredicative (as Gödel said) and the range of mathematical expression is not curtailed by, e.g., Dedekind cuts.

MM.' Arithmetic paradoxes can be epistemological, not just that epistemological paradoxes can be interpreted as maintaining incompleteness theorems. You can't derive mathematics from logic when logic is dependent on sets that are **invented,** *devised*, in their case to lord over arithmetical lines in order to efficiently legislate against annoying numbers such as pi or the square root of 2, or even a Goblin, and a Goblin is what we have now.

MM.'' Saying that that is what we in fact do however when thinking and writing about the matter is that self-same aggrandizing Roman Salute, ceremonial gesture in the motley sense. It is dangerous: Put your arm at straight and raise it to eye's length with hand straight, and pause, then move the wrist up. Feel your anus contract, and you have the verbal expression of it, very scatological with an immediate need to transfer it as ′schuld′ on some other targeted group in society. Heil. If you don't believe in this, I can point you to articles about the latter, and to the philosophical grammar of the former, which we learned from the very best who were trying to crack modal logic.

"Watch my anus." As Heinrich Heine said, it is the Hun when he throws away his Cross.

MM'''. Further work will be done on the fact that Gödel said that his incompleteness theorem could be applied to epistemological paradoxes. We need to provide examples and spell the whole system out, but I will just mention one of the most ideal ones, the Grelling / Heterological Paradox. Von Wright's demonstration of it takes us out of the added axiom for the left over 'y' without a binding-category, with wonder elegance. Working with the Gödel material with the utmost seriousness about it, leads us to von Wright's elegant solution to that and other paradoxes. It is a fine-tuning of Gödel, being . . .

. . . that it might be, but it might be so only because *it can*, not because it is the necessary next step, or, rather, because it is the prudence of nature to do so. Refer back to:

> N.''. 'MM, and that becomes perfectly clear. No, I prefer functors (von Wright) for more semantically complex systems that move us into places like quantum logic, and colorfully nuanced to high degrees of famous stimulations, like the Stendhal's syndrome with Rome, or the Pythagorean Theorem, that Golden Fleece, that made Michelangelo's David the most beautifully proportioned thing on earth.

MMM. Salutations are purely in the modal domain of unwholesome ceremony when dug out of mathematics or any other area – i.e. a scatological matter like, "sh*t" or "f***, or "empty my Teutonic-Hun bowels after saluting with my anus in tow and transfer nightwater of my emptied to Jews and Gypsies and Defectives" – or out of a false notion put out about the subject as rumor or gossip, per Vico.

MMM'. Logic does not derive of mathematics, it's role different is, it can't, it is an analytical helper for modal expressions as it always has been without or without serious reifications. If that were not the case, every equation would be its own limit function. Which, in fact, they are. That is an issue.

MMMM. It comes of the system of linguistic grammar. To what uses it can be put are seen here. The intentional conflation of modality with mathematics without concern for

the role of modality and mathematics respectively (or their places in our corpus, or what have you) is egregious by virtue of the creation of systems which are manipulative in the worst sense of the word. Some modal systems are algebraic and therefore very fascinating and helpful. When modal logic is seen as a reification of the conditions on and of human life modality is stretched out to its ancient Homeric ranges and it provides for infinitely more expressive and expressional power and human utility for human thinking and acting. In literature especially, as well as in Aristotle (who was a wise-guy, and doesn't deserve as much mention as he's getting here), this modality tends towards the "alethic," which is an area worthy of further investigation at a later point. . .

> 5M. . . . ***being,*** however, that the alethic is not reified by human intervention but by nature nurturing nature, pace Spinoza. That is why it is the 'athletic' modality, as in the Marathon. By Aristotle's terms it cannot be distinguished from an epistemic modality; but of course it can if we leave Aristotle and his present day adherents in this domain behind, and that is very important to the behaviorist concept of Skinner's work "Verbal Behavior", where there is Shaping: intra-S-R-R: Stimulus – Reward – Reinforcement. This is a very interesting area, since it harks back and into the indexed forms that are at best deictic, if not anaphoric. (That is again a conflation. It allows researcher and politicians and torturers and bad people to take part in very bad areas of activity: They move the weak and the vulnerable to their wishes, with this Pavlovian tool-box, and that is an evil and cruel thing that breaks all moral and ethical boundaries, it breaks the *deontic* modality upon which all the modalities are dependent as they are all dependent on one another because they are wired-in to language, with tense and aspect, so goes the grammatical nucleus TMA (Tense-Mood/Modality-Aspect.)

> 5MM'. If deictic, it's still not decrypted. "They turn in clusters, because their roots connect them. Come back to work — to life." – Scooter Libby, where the *place*, the *people*, the *time*, are not known, but the Gödelian anaphoric sentence is in place / indexed for further use. Finding anaphora and deictic in Gödel is not a small feat, and is not manufactured. It's a natural thing, as I am continually wont to say.

N. What protects the mind from this pernicious apparatus in the hands of man is the fact that every equation is its own limit. It is when we throw an equation into a loop where Boolean algebra is the responsible syntax, and operations which fault-in by default, but can only get to work when the loop is so contained so as to get to work: The function F n + n2 is an asymptotic arithmetic expansion or contraction. It is one of nictitates. The container will recognize entailment and the limits will be *set*. Make it initial, posit *x,* and the machine gets to work. That protects us from the Pavlovian tool box and dispenses with it as a flaw in human nature, which is not a dismissal if it is a flaw. There is where we get a natural sense for ethics, in such places.

NN. That is one of the evolutionary functions of loop.sf.Fn, even shorter LSFN. The function f x becomes its own limit, since *x* doesn't change, but the output does: f x = x + j, where x (e.g.) = 3 = 3 + j. x can be prime or non-prime. The higher point being that the are *Indexed.* There are no limitations naturally stated that there shouldn't be. You can imagine how after that the equation f x that is thrown in after the Boolean algebra is set up and the asymptotic function f n = n + n2 imputed makes it the case that the changing of a regular function f x comes out in forms of complex numbers, i.e. ix, jx, kx. It is its own limit, and it may replicate. It can come in as prime and come out as non-prime. It can go in as non-prime, and come out as prime. Fascinatingly!, there is no need for a stipulation, even if you wanted one, you'd be proven a fool. It's f---ing indexed, deictic man, fixed, designated, except for time and locative (the "shades aspect over verbal behavior") in language, subsuming all and any anaphora to it until the Tense Mood Aspect, locative-tense (past, present, or future) is determined. That also plays on the horizontal arithmetical line where irrationals get in the way, so as to the invention sets and set-theory, and how they by their membership structures and allowances variably influence Dedekind cut-offs for free ranges of arithmetical expression, having stripped the line of its syntax. The idea of a line of arithmetic as syntax until its stripped of its irrationals and other obstacles by means of various sets and then becomes semantic, meaningful, and entailed out of the syntax, is interesting from the point of view of constructivist mathematical and epistemological theories – which have to be wrong, muddled, in this Wittgenstein was right about sets; only intuitions sets avoid this, since they have a hierarchy that is covariant with the rational and the irrational numbers along the line. At least, I say so. I stake part not whole of my critique on it. I wouldn't believe it if it were not for reading Nash on it.

NN'. That makes the issue of primes in arithmetic apparently moot, *after* they have come through LSFN. Still, even if not so in the sense that we can disregard the nature of a number's properties, a *limit* of the matter of added axioms to a system to account for anything whatsoever would seem quite the result: i.e., that as far calculability is concerned (and that *is* what happened, a *calculation* was made; not computational algorithm could possibly have been involved, since we did created one, we just stipulated the terms of the calculus. It's calculable, computational (not in algorithmic sense, although you can call any damned thing you want, even idiotic):

> This needs more investigation. As Solzhenitsyn wrote, **'Where there is law, there is crime.'** There's no conflation here between natural law and juristic law in the sense of what that mathematician turned writer wrote, quite to the contrary, they intersect, and go into synthesis: juristic and natural law; it's as old as John Lock, and as new as the U.S. Constitution. Lincoln expressed this particular synthetic persuasion of the mind beautifully on several occasions.

We don't rely on incompleteness theorems or concepts at that time. It seems unimaginable after so much conditioning as to Gödel numbers and sentences, but it is true, and proof is in the past, or has already happened: it would be like Wheeler's X, except for the fact that photons and the trips we plan for them do not start as TRU or PRF, but as INIT, and NON-INIT. One doesn't require or even see modus ponens any more. Somewhere, it's either in drop-thru from where we could see it but now into an unidentified (by us) system. One sees it only inductively. Perhaps one may desire to state the it can be seen *as a* partial derivation, but would very what is un-aptly an obsessively called 'constructivist mathematics,' or simply 'constructivism.' Modes ponens disappeared and we see it inductively, with ability to posit that it is working away somewhere this new world of gnomes and goblins, but we don't need to see it or take account of it, or do we? Do we give a different world *w*? No! That's our stipulation for our own satisfaction, we can do it, and create an uncertainty principle, at most.

All of that requires further investigation.

In fact, if LSFN took us to a world where we don't dote on added axioms to encode as arithmetic anomalies, we may as well have entered in a different world *w,* where modes ponens has already done its work and can now, if anything, only possibly work as a

way of reversing the LSFN process. That is an information and symmetry-breaking-in-entropy issue. And how would we know to do that? You can start with LSFN only once for any / each equation f x = ix, ij, ik,…. depending on your criteria for choosing the equations you want put into the that calculus. Look, there is enough to try to understand here. This is simply on the extreme limit of anaphora. Beyond that, it can't be expressed. It's Balzac's *All is true!* It might be the 1904 World's Fair! Do you understand that? It's so far on the extreme of anaphora that it has reached what is equal to the limit of anaphora, the deictic, or deixis, which is still not enough. One must draw the graph of a vertical or horizontal line of an asymptotic function to even express that, and that's still not enough. Then key one's attention into the encoded Gödel number, then avail oneself of the falling through of this number into the world of entailment, which is the whole matter of Gödel's turnstile for [Therefore P, where we get meaning, semantics, and expression: a syntax stripped of its theorem-centric relevance for the moment giving way to (a) meaningful expression(s). This is the critique. From syntax to form, from structure to content, from syncategorematic (with No quantification of the quantified), to a category (without reciprocal quantification). Pierce is dead. He never introduced the existential operator. Russell didn't mess with things and put in the universal quantifier, both artificial entities, pseudo-Fregean crap. That's why this is so hard. That's why mathematics has overrun physics with insane pseudo-geometrical objects that move to categories, which is logical; but for the increasingly lavishing M-Theory, blowing away general relativity for a thousand years of mathematical toying with sets as categories: enter Cosmology. How disrespectful, how revanchist.

Which is fine, except for the ethics of it. But there is a reason for *critique.* It's moot unless accepted, not proven. The reader makes the call for him / herself. A critique has the impossible job of putting out meaning into the world while not theorizing, form and syntax outside of the brackets of theory. Let me make a picture of that: <syntax, form> <theory>. That is what critique contributes to theoretical reasoning, not so much as to theory itself. That is hard enough. Putting out meaning is the hard part, since it can be taken for attempting to theorize (a fail-safe in the wrong game), and the theorizing may be rough, crude, even barbed, for all that, it has teeth though if goes that wrong way. That's to be avoided, it cost us millions of lives in the 20th Century. However you arrive at these points, is not so important, so long as they are one individual's work and exercises in understanding (whether that goes well, or badly, so long as they are

exercises) according to one's abilities and stamina, with no unethical consequences. I repeat:

> However you arrive at these points, is not so important, so long as they are one individual's work and exercises in understanding (whether that goes well, or badly, so long as they are exercises) according to one's abilities and stamina, with no unethical consequences.

NN''. What if an error for it fall-thru into an unidentified system, was by let's say *spin* pre-destined to do so, I don't think so. I think it was an error that was corrected by a functor, for every error in a system there is functor to correct it: so a posteriori, one might be able to recover it, in standard Euclidean terms, but not if it has already fastened into a plane in a system where it has come out as an expression, i.e. modus ponens was effective there. But, we can with the greatest of ease write an a posteriori resurrection as a theorem, or a new Gödel number. Is that recursive? No! It is covering our asses, the new Gödel may be false, while the truth of the fact that in a fall-thru the modus ponens will eventually do something to fasten itself somewhere to act in entailment, and we can *know* that by induction. Only when it disappears does induction work, otherwise induction doesn't work, because we see it all, and for that we need a Gödel number. That is very interesting. As to on the other hand reversing equations in natural law back through the algebraic incorporation of an asymptotic equation as $f\,n = n + n2$, to process any given equation such as $f\,x = 3$, only we would have to assume (not because we are so confident in our algebraic machine) but by definition we would have to *know* whether it is can be or *is* prone to error, in order to make an a posteriori visible to us; only the machine can know determine that: it will make a make a drop-thru much as it would a an entailment from *s.f.* to stripping the syntax of *s.f.* down to the entailment of *s.f.x*. If the machine wats to go on living, it has to drop-thru a previously unknown method to debug it, i.e. to fix it a posteriori. A method is an expression, a set of instructions. Who would carry them out doesn't matter. The machine can easily duplicate itself to its initial state just before an error happens, and a different equation will be thrown at it, not the previous one. But what if something has stirred in the universe, or, as it were, in the universe of discourse, in the Cartesian Product of matters, in that Cartesian frame, does the tipping of light-cones around a single axis of time change our constants? Maybe in such a case mass needs light cubed, not squared, but then what happens of the inverse proportionality? These are big issue and not pleasant.

Are we light years before relativity, or are valid at the moment, or are talking about the future. What kind of reasoning is this. Or, is there not *there* here. And not to beat the beast overly, was there a *there*, and/or will there be a there *there.* Gödel is very clear on the light-cones in his theory of relativity. This critique may not be valid right now. Or at all. But, this is going too far. It's no longer edifying, fun, or even informative. On to NNN.

NNN. The reliance of the laws of physics on modus ponens qua or pace Gödel drop-thru is buried, which was but a relic of a necessitated and natural extension of mathematics done by Gödel. But it doesn't necessarily mean that the laws of physics no longer work, are no long 'reliable,' which is not a term, but a denotation. However entailment without an *antecedent* (the impliciture of its existence somewhere is pure conjecture: I simply don't believe that you can reverse an equation for the sake of a not so very mild human observation). Once dropped-thru the algebraic machine of one or more Boolean asymptotic equations, natural law, i.e. nomic contrary-to-fact, i.e. *sf.x* entailed-out of the *sf* syntax of the system, there's no going back. The consequent without the antecedent is the only constant left, logically speaking, mathematically speaking, naturally speaking, speaking in terms of that which makes the laws of physics, natural laws, what they are: nomic precedence and consequence. You can possibly move an equation by tilting light cones that keep their respective signals in a rotational orbit around a single axis of time but you can't reverse what happened or what should happened under other circumstances: for one thing, you, a priori, would go along, and if the other equations are wrong or don't work with the equation chosen, you will get torn. Besides, there's no longer any valence with P, with respect to Q or anything, so you might end up creating a new equation should the equations on this side carry you that far, since the equations as they stand here are their own limits, not having any calculability. It's like the philosophy professor and his rock. We aren't even in a position to apply Wheeler's Delayed Choice experiment (this thought-experiment was proven, probably after his death, I don't know).

NNN'. However, bear in mind, for example within the light of Wheeler's Delayed Choice experiment, or anything, all of these words here are worth nothing. That is an empirical matter for testing his though-experiment. But *this here* is *Critique.* Nothing more, *nor less*. The most difficult thing in critique, which Kant didn't get at all, his ambitions insane and psychopathic, and to berserker evil consequence as a result. . . but

the most difficult thing about a *Critique* in the realm of physics and in epistemology, which is inevitably where it occurs, unless it's about fishing for trout, a more rational and enjoyable and peaceful choice, is to stay away from how you want things to be. To follow reason *too closely¸* is to make it bend to your aims, and to un-reason. In science, this is partially admissible, since proof is required or verification or reproducibility or all, or some as some depend on the other, which is supposed to provide a check, but in *Critique,* such following *too* close is a declaration nearly of invincible ignorance, an insistence on discursive deduction and trial and error by declaring in in public what you'll admit into your argument and what you will not. There are many physicists who do this outside of critique, and a lot of it happens in Cosmology and its evolving theoretical and mathematical frameworks, with a new intersection of specializations of researchers or scientists or mathematicians and even logicians directly involved with each other; the more famous the declarer is, the more power on this bully pulpit does s/he have to do it with, and an outright rigor mortis of rigorous thinking and reasoning is required in their papers, which more and more become like political speeches. The dominant political scientist (forgive the pun), often is fast-tracked through peer review, in a manner similar of Congressional appointments, certain of them. But a critique must allow for every possibility and for every possibility the possibility of its absence, including for that of itself, the critique, of which it has to question all the time: so don't go for radical (real) critique unless you are prepared for tedium and self-doubt. Or, you fake it, and live with that on your conscience, as Kant did, but he didn't have a conscience. The best a critique can ever do is to move to a point where it begins to shed its terms, *not to add them*. What's left will be a document that is of value or not. If it is, it must be immediately recognizable as a work on ethics, it matters not how it got there, which is the point. It will be forever an inquiry that has followed reason into far reaches and shed its coats, like a bear in summer: in a way, it is Shakespearean.

NNN''. *Not*-P AND Q, which was always the case for entailment when P was not present in the existence and disjunction property and is the desired outcome for theoreticians, thus disjunct yet still entailed, but normally in the form of X and *Not*-A, which is easier written in its truth function.

P	Q	P, then Q
F	T	T

I'll refer to it as FT

NNNN. It's easy to put this into a more formal language: We would simply invoke the *existence property* and take out disjunction (actually, it doesn't matter, it is neutralized anyway, but it does matter, since that testifies to *two* properties, not on) and state / assert that (x) Q x. In other words, (E x ϵ N) ϕ (x), where ϕ has no other free variable than Q, then it proves ϕ (*n*) for some n ϵ N. In other words, Q will hold of x no matter what holds of x, be it P or anything else. We write the symbolic features of a complete break-down of in modus ponens, as such : ¬ (E x) P x, or (x) Q x. Still, that does not do justice to the strength of modus ponens, so it is not the end of the story. Something else has to affect then without adducement of causation. But in fact, nothing really *has to* affect them, and that is not said as a tautological trick, it simply fits the picture: why should we need to adduce anything of them, does it make that much sense to do so? If it doesn't make that much sense, it makes no sense.

O. "In axiomatic set theory, one of the legislative functions of the axioms is to prohibit the existence of sets which would cause trouble, and the various axiom systems can be classified according to the manner in which the paradoxes are blocked." I wouldn't call them paradoxes unless they are already semantic, i.e. already in the domain of entailment, where epistemology has taken root. But also (and it would be very interesting if they were the same things!), this idea of a paradox is the inherited hierarchical mirroring of Gödel incompleteness in The *FT in LSFN.* But there are very few real paradoxes, the ones that there are are profound because their solutions are so very f----ing elegant and inspirational. In the general norm (a term in need of shifting to its right slot, since it reduces more than it increases, and that is part of successful critique, so wants explication in any case), every equation, every formulation, every wff, is its own limit, an inheritance that it gets from Gödelian arithmetic which would otherwise (whatever that would be) be called a built-in fail-safe property, not a fail-safe mechanism, or distinctive object separate from the equation or the formulation or the wff. It is simply a matter of form: Einstein's field equations cease to apply in the same way and it has nothing to do with causation or with the equations or their applicability. There is so much reinforcement here, from the beginning of O. to the end of O. A full critique of O. is badly needed.

P. At this point logic (not as such) should be taken to its Gödelian limit. It's actually a very clear natural order of things.

1. Logic is not a natural science. Mathematics is a natural science.
2. Both follow de Morgan's laws without variance from the other.
3. Arithmetic and logic are the basis is the basis of algebra.
4. Algebra makes the exhibition of geometry possible. It's not a projection of algebra. (This misunderstanding is the *cause* of most of our 'paradoxes'.)
5. Logic's sum are its elements: $\Sigma = \forall\exists$, PX, $\neg\vee\wedge$.
3.1. $\forall\exists$. The quantifiers.
3.2. PX. The propositions and their characteristics, or arguments.
3.3. $\vee\wedge\neg$. The logical connectives and the single logical operator.
4. There is no such thing as a lower or higher order logic. There is one unique logical calculus. Its logical sum is $\forall\exists$, PX, $\neg\vee\wedge$.

5. Any element of $\forall\exists$, PX, $\neg\vee\wedge$ is syncategorematic except for X.
6. Any element of $\forall\exists$, PX, $\neg\vee\wedge$ is not syncategorematic if with X, including X itself. That contradicts point 5. It simply says that X is neither syncategorematic nor a-syncategorematic. Alone, it stands alone. Any other element that is alone, stands in need of X.
6.1. This is important for ground rules.
6.2. Ground rules are not important for the Gödel-sentence.
6.3. Ground rules are important for the function of the Gödel-sentence. Therefore they are important for the Gödel-sentence. That contradicts point 6.2. By transmission however 6.3 is normative and therefore not contradictory of 6.2.

Q. What however if P x suddenly presents itself, from out of the blue? Will the conditionship relation (CFC) of P and Q (still) hold (did it ever?), and if so, in the first place why, and secondly: Because we might want to establish if it *ever held?* We return to 5L.5L'.

Q. One new logical operator is introduced, instead of more, of which I will write in the next edition of this work: Negation is a property of that which it negates. Often, as in Marxian theory, it creates a new thing when it negates the negation which gives

something different from the original proposition. Von Wright brilliantly pulled out the system dynamics of this. X is negated: A primary feedback system that resists the negation of the original proposition (assertion) *x*; a *secondary system* negates that negation, 'quieting' the original negation. But it is also a property of anything it negates in the immediate sense of no further consequences, i.e. P = P; ¬P ≠ P; ¬¬P = P. , which translates to *always*: NOT-P or, Not-*x*. Both ways are a meaningful. A propositional variable P simply isn't the case only in the purist sense of truth-functions (however, we can differential between the two differently meaningful negated negations using what I call normative truth-tables, which are simply interpreted differently with invariance in definitions as the rule, as in relativity, a theory of classical invariance actually) with their purist truth-tables; nor even, if P is outside of that and instead playing a cognate part itself in a Boolean game of algebra, P always has a property by inheritance in Boolean algebra. Maybe in this case it's a sentence P in the subjunctive mood, which has nothing to do with truth-functions: Pp is "The grass is always greener on the other side" (and I haven't even invoked a modal auxiliary verb, nor *The Negation Operator*), still NOT-Pp is a property of it: "The grass always browner on the other side." These are interesting toys (this aspectual negation of "… always browner on the other side… is not an actual negation, of course, it shifts the filler in the anaphora of the sentence, i.e. the deictic is a function of the aspectual possibilities of hard-linked verbal-play) but they matter not a rat's ass in everyday life. Or, rather, they matter a lot, especially in the stealth pseudo-negation just given.

> *This matter is probably the most fruitful part of this critique in terms of real life interest, of real extensions into semantics, perception, etc. This is real systems dynamics. Modals, primary and secondary feedback for un-ambiguous initial and intermediate and terminal objects, etc. It is another of those things that is persuasively aesthetic and keening to the mind, there is a sense of satisfaction with the elegance of un-feigned subtlety.*

I had intended to use another of von Wright's solutions to a paradox that is an epistemological issue – the above is mine, but I learned how to do such things from a great 'philosophical grammarian' of the Austin and Wittgenstein set at the university of California, with them the true (I'm aware of the Scotsman's Fallacy – which is fallacy only because Latin in not properly understood: de res, virtue, reference, it's a whole field in itself, accounts for all of philosophy to date, it does) interpretation and work in the area has disappeared into the miasma of the new university cultures of obfuscation

and hazardous arbitrarily adopted material. Unpack *that.* But that paradox is an example of a far too precious paradox to tamper with here (not that it's not there partially, it is, partially, so that's taken care of in any case, and can be gone into later). I could address this all with a simple token sentence: ***the specificity of something is not a function of formal syntax affecting semantics, it is a matter of taking anaphora to its full limit, where it jumps the deictic entirely.*** I would love to give an example of this, but it's far too precious to share. It's with Balzac somewhere in *All is true¸* with its un-ending possible reciprocals. Noting that as well von Wright's work on hard epistemological paradoxes lends me better to Quantum Logic, and both the presentation of the paradox and the quantum are traditional forms of axiomatic item and theorems, with substitutability, the whole shebang. Which is a welcome, not departure, but distraction for me. But you can see work on that paradox and on quantum logic here, their intersection by means of a functor in the paradox and a divisibility relation in the quantum logic is key. https://www.scribd.com/doc/114108782/Scratch-Notes-on-Quantum-Logic-Turing-Goedel-Nash

QQ. But we still need negation, the lonely NOT. In which case, we introduce a new operator: it is the old one, **NOT**. That's right, that is the New Operator: NOT, or ¬.

QQQ. Negation has always tended to create itself by what would otherwise be inchoate, and the example of the Marxian negation of the negation in the classically interpreted and the more modern extended rendering of it in terms of the systems dynamics primary and secondary feedback, and the nature of their looping effects on the original, the intermediary, and the new original, all held within a rotational silo of non-local spins of feedback, which is probably much more sophisticated than a primary primary and a secondary secondary. It rotates around as it gathers the accumulative energy to do its work. Its rotate-around (a bending-orthogonal) axis is time, and that's the final final there, since the negated object occupies no space in the mind, discourse, or in physical reality. It occupies time, leaving it empty when its finished and a new object is arranged. *The feedbacks inter-couple with Bayesian networks.* This is the second of the most interesting areas for real-time investigation in this paper where critique has transcended itself beyond its anaphoric limitations, beyond constant questioning, which is gotten to by that very method. Yes, there is so much self-reference, and I have not mentioned it so far, because an attentive reader may be have noticed it or felt it and gotten tired of it,

thinking it a constant exercise in self-reference. It's not; it's where the "availability heuristic" is most strong in this paper for any reader, understandably, even though it makes no difference the whole matter when recognized. Independently the *availability heuristic* is a fascinating area, and it will researched further in later versions or editions of this paper / work. It yield's to induction and Bayesian networks, and more.

R. I look at it as a bit of political philosophy in Las Vegas, or on a southern chain gang, the same game that can be played in two different kinds of places, at the same time or at different times; but each situation has its own culture, *Luke* is a haunting, Vegas is vice:

> Marx (Das Kapital, Vegas) always folds with nothing and wins the hand big: "Yeah, well, sometimes nothing is a real cool hand." – Luke, *Cool Hand Luke.* No sleights of hand. Just a fold and a bluff: Here is a series of conceits that is as effective as John Donne, and as lucrative, which happens to be satisfying and pleasing to this author. But the fact is that the effectiveness and the lucrativeness of this little vortex of conceits is not said in jest, the connected figures of speech and the pun or two are meant to be taken seriously, and only righteous academic indignation at breaking (among other things) Skinner's 'shaping' S-R-R model of standard formats would be so bold to challenge this do so.

RR. Keeping with this oeuvre: Marx and Vico came to the same conclusion, only that Marx thought that Marxism was the final state of history; Vico knew that a 'marxism' would be an eventuality. But he didn't believe that things stop there but that history goes in cycles, that this 'marxism' would rotate out, so to speak. He also said we haven't completed the first cycle, while Marx was very dogmatic clear about the horizon being a flat free-fall off an edge that kept people in, just as National Socialism did, and still does. Vico by his writings was much smarter than Marx. I'll ride with Gödel's kin Vico into the sunset at any break into dusk or into dawn, but not into the flat-earth concentration camps with Marx. This bears to be bared: B.F. Skinner stated that the Nazis tried to create a superhuman race; he said they didn't have genetic engineering, so that the only possibility was concentration camps. Whereas, we, Skinner said, have the advantage of be able to change society's members (people) by behavioral engineering and that that doesn't require concentration camps. Think about that. That's part of the critique. Did he say that? Yes. I've got him verbatim to this slightly

paraphrased statement. The non-fuzzy source material is available; i.e. he is audio-visually on record.

S. Fiats (a cool hand card draw over Marx's linear alternative), cycles (James Joyce's reverence for and use of Vico, where history does turn and flat earth work camps do rotate out), and icons (that would also be Joyce) the signs of our epochal periods seem best suited to man. In combination you won't find a society that sets up concentration camps, but we clearly aren't there yet. Someone hand me a Mandela Wheel, pace Michael J. Burns.

SS. It all sort of reminded me, and I am not sure why, but of something Wittgenstein wrote, I don't remember in which book it was post-humously collected, but it must have been *On Certainty* on thinking about it: "If the induction of a squirrel is good enough for the squirrel, it's good enough for a human." Or did he say, 'man'. It doesn't so much remind me of it all anymore, I just remember being reminded. So it's included. It does have a certain form though.

T. How is modus ponens related to space-time? Rotationally, when a world line for John passes another world line for John and they can but only observe each other because they are parallel and disjunct (by Euclid), or if one or both cross each other's world lines at certain points by future-forward-up, past-back-down, etc., for an entire *Bayesian* matrix of the possibilities.

TT. (There are many cherries to be picked here [there's another logical fallacy for cherry picking, which is but a figure of speech: when humans get obsessed on topic, even a hobby, such as logical fallacies, it becomes a vice and pathetically so, as Balzac's had illustrated (demonstrated?) by exemplar studies of such people]. Remember it was Gödel who wrote the future-forward-up et. al. rules or facets of his theory relativity, and with a general – as of now, or not now, even, but later, future – Bayesian treatment the cherries might fall before we can pick them!)

TTT. The two Johns might meet at a single point where they are not merely co-tenable as in the other situations, but hit each other when they cross each other's world line; then something must give. What might that be? A new axiom, A, a Gödel number, and a sentence. For they could not survive without intervention because they are supposed to be eternally *disjunct* (DWP) and cannot often *witness* (DWP) each other, but for (and

where we might posit a possible teleological strong element) precisely that occasional happenstance, which would a very prudent property of the universe that tends to resolve contradictions pace Burns; duplications aren't allowed (duplicates are) without a generative method or a humanly contrived device capable of generating them (intuitionist sets in both cases), which could be the case here, as well, or both. That device (I don't know, say a CPU that separates cached data from the from the software processing, something I believe used in one or other forms of ciphering in cryptography) or method would have to be on either a different slice of space-time or on a different world-line. Or, it might be carried by one of the John's just in case, in the event of, by motivation or the sensible prudence of the universe to resolve contradictions, so that this John has the chance of survival should such an event occur. (But when would he have known to pick this up? Where did he get it? Does he know what it's for? Was it the universe's tendency to resolve contradictions, pace Michael J. Burns, does he know that he has it, is it an accouterment, enough; but don't the two possibilities begin to appear the same?). But if the latter or both or the same, a force denominator might be just what the two Johns might want, or otherwise, again by the prudence of the universe, need, need in the *natural sense*: to be co-tenable, not disjunct, but not changing their respective rotational tangent slope world lines, once they have meet, becoming technically disjunct (Euclidean) once they are satisfied with each other and the meeting, or whatever it is they need of one another: so that, a rotund belly of sorts, if the slope has a measure below as a pendant curve gravitating in the direction of a bent-over light-cone of the tangent line (compare it to a healthy belly: dark fat, which is real, actually) inversely proportional to the speed at which they enter into and remove themselves from this situation.

TT. It is the rotund pendant curve below the slope that allows the two Johns to remain co-tenable, disjunct, yet in each other's signals as they go one another's way, thus, by the pendant curve, avoiding duplication, they remain duplicates, but duplicates newly informed about one another. The pendant curve would be a field with such properties and elasticity. The radical proposition is that no functors would be needed to cover for non-locality as they move along their world lines which are rotated (they stay in this curve) by the tangent slope with its pendant field. And what if that Gödelian LSFN machine with all of its integrated circuitry of counterfactuals and disjunction and witness properties, P and Q, drop-through, entailment, etc., is Gödel's rotating universe, where Einstein's field equations do apply (they do, it is said, the two took daily walks

together, irrelevant technically). What if the Gödelian LSFN is the centrifugal force that Gödel says holds the system together around a single axis of time, as a novel interpretation from the other much more formalized interpretations. That's critique. Sometimes a novel hypothesis pops out, it can't be helped if it does, and if it does, the critique would be incomplete and dishonest if it suppressed it. Or, what if they're covariant? In that case, would *they* be non-local, or would it be the underpinning of an uncertainty principle, or what? Maybe nothing.

TTT. Gödel's centrifugally rotated light cones might insure this.

U. But in the main of things, I put all behind new logical operators and all such things so far discussed, etc., and the writing itself with all of its content, behind and judge it moot when measured by this: There is not intended in the paper and hopefully not unconsciously made present there, any double entendre, no blackface MIT minstrel shows as have occurred daily since the 1950s in Chomsky's Quad, with Skinner doing the cakewalk in violation of the Geneva conventions, and as a result, I hope very desperately: no strawman. As much as the (not limited to) MIT blackface minstrel performances are concerned, I hope there is as well no Wittgenstein present outside of what he is / was by *verite* and not by his less than Shakespearean but his occasional and unsettling mastery of entirely Faustian thoughts. But Wittgenstein deserves a pardon. Ethics was his goal. Ethics was all he cared about in the end. And he was a fighter, he was always fighting what called "a kind of Weltanshaung" that he picked up from Schopenhauer, who had relative control over his, and was the better of the others W picked it up from. That was as ethical an act as a man can do. To fight against a world-view, the most dangerous thing to humankind and the most prone are the philosophers and the writers of political economy, writers and scribes of all suns and sundry laundries, forgive me the puns, I have read too much Shakespeare. He never admitted it, but he was battling Kant, not Russell (that was easy), and not trying to clarify Frege (that was a good cakewalk), these two latter men were a means to an end, it's clear in his numerous mentions of Kant scattered seemingly haphazard through his whole incredible oeuvre, with its range, and depth. W's ability to adapt and think-through and *critique* life using tools that he understood, first truth-functions and tautologies and the negation operator in the Tractatus, and then quintessentially his 'language-games' was one of the most remarkable feats of a thinking life in *understood* history, in *sacred* not *brutois* history, except for his occasions to fall for Goethe's proverbs. Because Goethe

went too far, the idea that he could challenge Newton with his theory of light was just too far, too chilling, and although we have modern 'color theory', a thing that needs attention, and was given well by the author *The Will: A Dual-Aspect Theory*, from Wittgenstein's thoughts about Goethe's challenge, it may not have been worth it; Goethe was too late in changing his mind on the Turks in their genocidal mania at that time, while Byron had already done the right thing in that regard: fighting them. The other real fighter, Heine, who openly opposed Kant and had these prophetic words to say, in a life where he had to run from anti-Semitism, censorship, his poem *The Weavers* having incited revolt, etc. – but above all his play *Almansor* is something I wish W had read, he was much to precious on Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, but not without merit or good reason— all his adult life:

> "Christianity – and that is its greatest merit – has somewhat mitigated that brutal Germanic love of war, but it could not destroy it. Should that subduing talisman, the cross, be shattered, the frenzied madness of the ancient warriors, that insane Berserk rage of which Nordic bards have spoken and sung so often, will once more burst into flame. This talisman is fragile, and the day will come when it will collapse miserably. Then the ancient stony gods will rise from the forgotten debris and rub the dust of a thousand years from their eyes, and finally Thor with his giant hammer will jump up and smash the Gothic cathedrals. . . Do not smile at the visionary who anticipates the same revolution in the realm of the visible as has taken place in the spiritual. Thought precedes action as lightning precedes thunder. German thunder is of true Germanic character; it is not very nimble, but rumbles along ponderously. Yet, it will come and when you hear a crashing such as never before has been heard in the world's history, then you know that the German thunderbolt has fallen at last. At that uproar the eagles of the air will drop dead, and lions in the remotest deserts of Africa will hide in their royal dens. A play will be performed in Germany which will make the French Revolution look like an innocent idyll. (1834)"

UU. Wittgenstein the rebel is what makes Wittgenstein's thought great, but he is difficult. If Wittgenstein were a theoretical object, he would be a "Dual-Aspect" one. *I cannot tell*, but I can examine my text for it, I must, no body of work can survive if ethics is not the edifice of it (the best), or not based on a strong predilection to ethics from the

start (second best, from the first, if we are to have popular ratings system), or is not immediately deducible or "uniquely *there"* as the edifice of the work (derivation doesn't cut it alone, inference doesn't cut it at all, induction is nature's hand-maiden but does not have a *basis outside of itself* that we have found for it *yet*; no, it's got to be there and spelled out, or clearly seen to be there, whatever the case it must be there for us in an utterly pellucid transaction that we interact with. In such product and composition, ethics is respect for all human beings and all life and all matter, the latter inclusive by default, which is no accident: it allows us to examine any man-made or derived matter that is dangerous to us, for example processed uranium, which must be respected so that we don't blow ourselves up. I hope that I have done my best, I am happy in the fact that I will never know.

Post-script, a Tale of Refusal up to U. Let U also stand for Underground Man. Here he is, taking on these matters as Dostoevsky did with him.

> "But what if I refuse these rules? I declare it, I refuse to obey these rules, I don't recognize or agree to their existence, they don't exist. It makes no difference: My declaration is still TRU, and my refusal is provable: just look inside my mind. I am not a bad man, I have not committed any crimes (as though I needed to say that!), I am simply declaring that the rules don't exist and even if you prove them to me I still refuse their existence and if I follow them it only appears so, I am probably drunk, because whatever you say can be shown to be TRU if you go to lengths, and I can take that to PRF, which is good enough for me. *That changes things. We* can take that to proof. *That changes things.* Am I in or out? If I'm drunk, I'm out. Or I say, No, I'm not! And if I am, so much the better, I have infiltrated the system from within, the best Clausewitzian-move of them all, and proven myself by self-mortification in so doing; furthermore, I am not making any declarations within them or without them, but wholly indifferent to them, and if I'm by some mad chance still within them, watch me huff it out of this blasted store! Was I right? All depends on what can be proven, doesn't it? The cards turn. You go back to Kant, I'll stick with Heine who calls Kant's hand only to reveal that the consequences of his books outside of his books in the real world of flesh and blood, where the books also exist and are forever extant with us (which is one of the reasons which this critique is happening), which was the Jewish holocaust: Heine called a spade a spade, and the consequences of the that spade

that he called on Kant were serious. A man who is not serious can take it somewhere else, unless he has a good sense of humor and outside of that is a loafer. Or, he's either a curiosity or a man of too noble qualities. Challenge Heine to take it to proof. He'll do it! He's been betrayed and he'll be betrayed again by Huns who toss the cross, who are not any longer confined to Kant's country. Tell me, then, about the Huns who toss the cross: Is genocide a closed system? Are their concentration camps? Are the prisons we have in America? Is there an incompleteness theorem for genocide? Of course, there is for every system. If it's a system, you mean to say: Did you just say that to me? Well it is a system, you say? Well, let's do the analytical work: genocide occurred and was reported and investigated it's true and documented but still they who did that work cannot prove that it happened and although macabre ('hmm, maybe that gets to it,' you say, and then ponder) *wherein we place* A. those who reported it, investigated it, documented it, substantiated its occurrence it in a court of law beyond a reasonable doubt, B. along with a statement that it is true but it can't be proven. No, my friends, B was never there, these people never had B. They didn't need it. Why do you? What about the dead, though? you ask. You must be sick, I answer. Or are you pondering? What about the ones who survived and witnessed it? No, that can't be, you say. There must be a language-game for that. Got you! I say: Now you embrace language-games, only now! It's the immediacy, isn't it, the truth striking truthfully, infallibly, with immediacy, while we have our tools in our hands? We see the moral ambiguity that can us make culpable, really so, and we don't want people to see it, so we summon the little reading we've done on Wittgenstein's "language-games" (or we summon something, we have to!, our theorems and our material will not be accepted by the journals, and our. . . sentiments, oh not our sentiment, please). Some of us say "But I started out at the beginning of my dissertation with a specialization in Wittgenstein's middle period, it was only later that I came to Gödel." I confirm that you have and that you have then surely read J.L. Austin's *A Plea for Excuses,* the best work on liberty since Thomas Paine's *Common Sense.* Then some of us respond, without answering the question about Tom Paine and J.L. Austin, that we had no choice in any case, and for that language-game we have, we must inform you, by the way, we had to add another axiom. How's that now? Did you really say that? First, that means that you really thought – think that the language-game (or whatever you summoned from the dead) worked in the first place! Or only

because you could avoid the moral ambiguity *with a language game* (or whatever!) that would cover for the presence of witnesses which require disjunction as they sit in the jury box, it's a fact, and then you have the curt to say that you also pinned up a new Gödel number on the totem pole? Nice try, Gödel didn't work with totems. You have misunderstood him and Heine has won.

"After all, a clever man can always say 'to hell with all of your arithmetic, I have better things to do, I'm an accountant for God's sake! Don't talk to me about numbers, I know numbers better than anyone! Oh, and they interact with papers, and contracts, and titles, and. . . everything in society! And since the beginning of civilization you intellectual doo dads.'

"Aha! And as far as that goes to the logician Gödel, that is the one thing that shatters the whole system. Gödel would be an oeuvre! It is not such a bad thing except for the fact that we didn't tell the man who said to hell with all of your arithmetic… that he's right, and give him a right nod of our heads in respect: We're tribalist snobs, as Christopher Hitchens would call us! 'Our sensibilities, you know, we're very noble, and we still haven't tired of romance, you know, it's too precious, don't you see!' Calm down, scribes: We should answer such people who spit on *our* arithmetic. There can be no doubt that such people are right in the larger sense (I am not speaking of scales, a sense takes care of all scales!). No under-study – and I mean that *literally¸* under-studies are one of the roots of our deontic life, unfortunately, our intelligence is simply too large not to *need* under-studies, they're all we have when we fall into doubt: God, for example – is required since all self-reflective women and men of average intelligence and sensitivity and lacking any sign of a groomed poodle in their minds (these groomed poodles we name sensibilities) would say the same thing. So would the "common man" (without hyphenating him!) on the street, who's writing up his stats for his sales today, and he's still there, make no doubt, he hasn't bitten the dust yet. It comes to the old truths of old definition on the one hand, and the old truth of encrypted and decrypted in clichés on the other, both of them fabulous accidental critics (ftnote).

"In this over-planned great city of ours, I hasten to add that Chomsky is the most predatory academic of the past fifty years. He has removed from people the

understanding and even the idea (that is an accomplishment!) of the special responsibilities that academics have because they are working with theories, conjectures, hypotheses, journals, peer review, peer review metrics, alpha-behavior, a male-dominated alpha-environment stronger much stronger than the one so hyped as to exist in commercial life; whereas other men and women have their heads filled with work that is of everyday life: accountants, carpenters, clerks, lawyers, taxi drivers, doctors, store and fast food employees, specialists of all sorts, etc., with much less alpha. Chomsky is the perfect example of the *knowing* victim of heuristic availability, he uses it, he is it's maestro, ranging from his manufacture of consent of his theory of syntax in the late 1950s to his aggressive, pedestrian and naïve use of the very patterns and methods of *The Manufacturing of Consent* in the political realm, that he was co-author of. That is part of the weakness of his book and his method, *The Manufacturing of Consent.* There are very few examples of this kind of person: the conscious framing of heuristic availabilities is a matter of raw manipulation for one simple reason, if it's not already clear: it's intended to pass those framed on to other people as though they were the natural items of their choices of what is available to them in the heuristic. Chomsky designs it for them without giving them the actual test of heuristic availability that would be representative. That is exemplary evil. It is the social engineering that B.F. Skinner spoke of, and it also amazingly substitutes for a different method, a proxy filler, for what Chomsky has called Skinner's "poverty of stimulus" in Skinners theory of verbal behavior, which is, in theory, the only thing that is able to challenge the psycholinguistic advances of the 1970s that transformational grammar had to adapt to, since these were empirical results.

"I end with an axiomatic denoument on power, where-else, Solzhenitsyn said 'Were there is law, there is crime.' We are therefore led to address the turbine: Power, of which I have written, but without humility is nothing. Power becomes force, instead of what it properly is: might. The ability to draw on resources, must be respected. The ability to draw on resources by itself alone is power as force, but it is not might. Respect for our ability to draw on resources is power as might. We need might. Might is nimble, and strong, progressive, and persistent, and it is also subtle. When used with discernment, it can arrange for and make contact with all possible contingencies, in the way that they should be arranged

and made contact with. That is power as might in use. Power as might doesn't know crisis in the way we have come to know it in a media world. It knows crisis as a matter to be addressed immediately with all resources available to draw on and more coming. It's because we have respected those resources, and our ability to draw on them, that we're able to continue doing this. It is the best a society can hope for. It is the best human society can hope for. And it is attainable. It is all that is needed. Conflict exists in a continuum, it always has. It's not a new idea. It's not a new truth. It's not a dogma. It's a fact. What addresses a continuum best? First, keeping the conflict inside the continuum, and not letting it out. If it gets out, we can't control it anyway. It spreads like wildfire. We don't control it when it's out. That's the answer to the question of what addresses a continuum best: power as might not as force, even though force as such is part of might. But might has no as such. When it leads, it inheres power to itself. If you mess with the continuum you mess with the resources, messing with yourself and your compatriots. Things break-up, the center cannot hold. Power takes over might as we lose everything we've got. Things burn. That extends us to ethics. That's how it's gone so far in recorded history. Things always burn. We always have to go to ethics, it's the natural reaction. Ethics is a science, that's also the natural reaction. That stands to reason. We've wasted all of our artful powers when we broke up that continuum and let it all burn. When ethics (science) is the best we can get after things burn (and we can't have it before that, that's not how nature works), the best we can do is critique the burn and hope that ethics comes of it. This is a more raw truth. It's also how nature works. It's very nearly destitute. Very few critiques come out as critiques. There's too much burn of the continuum to keep on a straight line and not explode as you write your critique. And there are just so few resources any longer. And we learn very slowly. We change very slowly. In fact, this all happens at once. And there's no metric for that except ourselves, whatever in the hell we may be. Of course, that's when you have to become a person who is serious about life. We can frolic, but Pan won't let us be serious as we frolic. Frolic is fun and there's a time for it, but it's also waste. Sometimes there's no time to waste, but sometimes all I want to do is waste my time with whatever it takes to drive off boredom.

"Take or leave it, ladies and gentlemen. My author has decided I've become too pessimistic and that I am upsetting people because of this inconsistency. He's

threatening me with irony. Given, that's not worst of things. When I was young, I rather enjoyed irony. No, that was when I was older. Older than I was then, you understand. Well, let him threaten me with irony. *I'm* not going to stop talking, not so long as the world is burning. I can't be any worse off of the world, nor can the world be any worse off of me. I'm harmless by choice, it's in crisis, the news is out, the media's having a field day, Brooklyn's gentrifying by the moment, Ferguson burns, Oakland waits, doing its best, the old Oakland doing its best, waiting to see. Pity the monsters! as the American poet Robert Lowell said."